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NOTES

The Rules of Consumption
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FEDERAL
EMULATION OF THE BIG APPLE’S FOOD LAWS
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is not just the usual suspects that are causing
American consumers to suffer from obesity and diabetes.
Actually, highly caloric fare entices our nation in the most
unexpected restaurants and food service establishments
(FSEs). Since the passage of New York City Health Code
Regulation 81.501 (Regulation 81.50) many New York City
(NYC) residents have discovered that the places they have
consistently regarded as more healthful are, in fact, not good
for their health at all. For example, there are 1140 calories in
Le Pain Quotidien’s Mediterranean Platter, a seemingly
wholesome and nutritious plate comprised of vegetable spreads
and assorted organic breads.2 Likewise, there are 1060 calories
in California Pizza Kitchen’s most healthful sounding
appetizer—Lettuce Wraps with minced chicken and shrimp.3
Unfortunately, these secretly fattening menu items are not just
fooling the residents of NYC—this is a problem affecting all of
America.
In enacting Regulation 81.50, NYC pioneered the menu
calorie-disclosure movement and provided our nation with an
essential litmus test.4 The constitutional success of the NYC
law encouraged many other states and cities across America to
1

N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50 (2008).
Sharing Platters, LE PAIN QUOTIDIEN, http://www.lepainquotidien.com/files/
Core%20-%20AC%20IX%2008%20-%20No%20price.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
3
Appetizers, CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN, http://www.cpk.com/menu/pdfs/
main-dessert-nutritional-menu.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
4
N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50.
2
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adopt their own versions of calorie-disclosure laws.5 As this
legislative trend was rapidly spreading, it was the appropriate
time for the federal government to adopt a clear national
mandate on menu calorie disclosures and take advantage of
this stepping stone towards reducing our nation’s levels of
obesity and diabetes.6 Congress preempted these myriad state
and local solutions by passing the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which included a federal caloriedisclosure provision.7 In doing so, Congress obviously
considered the benefits that a federal mandate would provide
for not only restaurants and FSEs nationwide, but also for all
American citizens.8 Despite the likely benefits of this law,
however, this note argues that Congress should recognize that
not all food-based health initiative laws are constitutionally
proper. Recent NYC mandates go beyond mere information
disclosure by regulating what people may consume.
In Part II, this note will review the rocky development
of Regulation 81.50 and discuss its requirements. In Part III,
this note will focus on the Second Circuit’s decision in New
York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health,
and discuss how NYC’s calorie-disclosure law prevailed over
two federal constitutional challenges.9 In addition, Part III will
discuss how NYC inspired other cities and states to adopt
5

See infra text accompanying notes 106-30.
See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50. Because it is outside the
scope of the forthcoming analysis, this note does not offer much background on the
extent of the obesity and diabetes crises. However, for excellent recent commentary on
the extent of these epidemics and their relatedness to calorie consumption, see Tamara
Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America, 47 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 587, 589-91 (2010); see also Brent Bernell, The History and Impact of the New
York City Menu Labeling Law, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 839, 840-45 (2010); Eloisa C.
Rodriguez-Dod, It’s Not a Small World After All: Regulating Obesity Globally, 79 MISS.
L.J. 697, 697-99 (2010). For another recent discussion of obesity and its relatedness to
the consumption of sugary drinks, see Jonathon Cummings, Obesity and Unhealthy
Consumption: The Public-Policy Case for Placing a Federal Sin Tax on Sugary
Beverages, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 273, 278-81 (2010).
7
See Lauren F. Gizzi, Note, State Menu-Labeling Legislation: A Dormant
Giant Waiting to Be Awoken by Commerce Clause Challenges, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 501,
533 (2009) (“Congress must adopt a federal law to ensure that restaurants can comply
with such regulations in a convenient manner, and also take a considerable step
toward ending the onslaught of obesity in the United States.”).
8
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, § 4205(b) (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Importantly,
it has been noted that “there are many . . . ways that the federal government could
intervene to improve . . . Americans’ health. Legislators could . . . enact legislation like New
York City’s new law which requires some restaurants to provide better nutritional
information.” David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing
Congress’s Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 373-74 (2007).
9
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
6
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similar laws.10 In Part IV, this note will review several failed
federal attempts to enact a national menu calorie-disclosure
law and discuss why it was the best time to adopt a national
mandate. Part IV will also analyze expected constitutional
challenges to the federal menu calorie-disclosure law and
explain why these challenges also will not be successful. Then,
in Part V, this note will discuss other food-based health
initiatives considered and adopted by the NYC government and
argue that similar measures should not be pursued as federal
mandates. Lastly, in Part VI, this note will conclude that the
federal government has appropriately passed the menu caloriedisclosure provision in the PPACA and should continue to
pursue other educational methods to diminish the prevalence
of obesity, diabetes, and other life-threatening epidemics in our
nation.
II.

NYC CALORIE-DISCLOSURE LAW

Regulation 81.50 is now a constitutionally-sound
calorie-disclosure law, requiring all restaurants and FSEs in
NYC with fifteen or more locations nationally to display the
caloric contents of each menu item, anywhere that menu items
are listed.11 But this was not always the case. This section
discusses the original version of the law, its prior constitutional
violations, and the subsequent amendments made by the NYC
legislature, which pioneered the calorie-disclosure movement in
America.12
A.

The Law as Originally Drafted

In December 2006, NYC’s Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, Board of Health (“Board of Health”), issued a
Notice of Adoption of the most recent amendment to Article 81:
Regulation 81.50.13 Through this new amendment, NYC hoped
to facilitate consumers’ ability to make healthier choices when
eating at restaurants and other FSEs by forcing them to
10

See infra text accompanying notes 106-30.
See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50.
12
For recent discussions of the development of Regulation 81.50, see Bernell,
supra note 6, at 845-52, and Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 6, at 701-06.
13
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF
ADOPTION OF AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.50) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH
CODE 1 (2006) [hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1], available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art81-50.pdf.
11
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consider calorie information at the moment of purchase.14 NYC
believed that providing consumers with calorie information
before they purchased food would result in weight loss and
healthier lifestyles, and thus reduce the epidemics of obesity
and diabetes.15
NYC’s concern about calories grew out of the rapidly
rising obesity rate among its citizens.16 The Board of Health
noted that “[c]onsumers consistently underestimate the
nutrient levels in food items and overestimate the
healthfulness of restaurant items.”17 While some restaurants
and other FSEs voluntarily provided consumers with “nutrition
information,” the methods employed were clearly insufficient,
as the obesity rate in NYC continued to rise.18 For example,
many businesses were placing calorie information on the
company website.19 But the obvious problem with this method
was that consumers needed to have access to the Internet at
the point of purchase in order to make informed decisions.20 In
addition to the company-website-display method, some
companies published information “in brochures, on placemats
covered with food items, or on food wrappers, where the
information is hard to find or difficult to read and only
accessible after the purchase is made.”21 It is no surprise that

14

See id. (“By requiring posting of available information concerning
restaurant menu item calorie content, so that such information is accessible at the time
of ordering, this Health Code amendment will allow individuals to make more informed
choices that can decrease their risk for the negative health effects of overweight and
obesity associated with excessive calorie intake.”).
15
See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120-21 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“Seeking to combat rising rates of obesity and associated health care
problems, in December 2006, the New York City Board of Health adopted the precursor
to the current Regulation 81.50 . . . . [which] mandated that any [FSE] voluntarily
publishing calorie information post such information on its menus and menu boards.”).
16
See NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1, supra note 13, at 2 (recognizing that “the
obesity rate among U.S. adults more than doubled over the past three decades from
14.5% in 1971-1974 to 32.2% in 2003-2004. In New York City, more than half of adults
are overweight and one in six is obese. . . . 21% of New York City kindergarten children
are obese.”).
17
Id. (citation omitted). “Recent studies found that 9 out of 10 people
underestimated the calorie content of less-healthy items by an average of more than
600 calories (almost 50% less than the actual calorie content).” Id.
18
Id. (“Current voluntary attempts by some [FSEs] to make available
nutrition information are inadequate particularly because the information is usually
not displayed where consumers are making their choices and purchases.”).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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these second-rate methods had little, if any, impact on
consumers’ food purchasing decisions.22
In considering possible solutions to the rising obesity
epidemic, NYC reviewed the success of the federal Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).23 Since its enactment, the
NLEA has noticeably affected consumer attitude and decision
making in regards to prepackaged food products purchased in
stores.24 Despite its successes, the NLEA exempted restaurants
from its nutrition labeling requirements, leaving people dining
outside the home to hazard an estimate about the nutrient
content of their food choices at the point of purchase.25 NYC
hoped that by extending the calorie information mandate to
include certain restaurants, healthful decision-making
practices would result because of consumers’ timely access to
such information.
In the Notice of Adoption of Regulation 81.50, NYC
argued that recent reports indicated that an overwhelming
majority of resident consumers would like to have calorie
information at certain restaurants and FSEs made available to
them, and were eagerly awaiting the enactment of this new
legislation.26 NYC noted that “approximately 2,200 written and
oral comments” were received from the public, and that “all but
22 supported the amendment.”27 With this great support from
NYC residents, the regulation was enacted on March 1, 2007.28
Regulation 81.50 required calorie disclosure only in places that
voluntarily chose to post such information on their menus and
menu boards—about ten percent of NYC’s restaurants and
FSEs.29

22

Id.
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104
Stat. 2353 (2004) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343).
24
NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1, supra note 13, at 2 (“Three-quarters of American
adults report using food labels, and about half (48%) report that nutrition information
on food labels has caused them to change their food purchasing habits.” (citations
omitted)).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 3 (“Six nationally representative polls have found that between 62%
to 87% of Americans support requiring restaurants to list nutrition information.”).
27
Id. at 4.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 3 (“This provision does not require any FSE to engage in analysis of
the nutrition content of its menu items, but does require restaurants that make such
information publicly available to their customers to post it in plain sight, so it is
available at the time of ordering.”) The new health code only applied to “standard menu
item[s] offered on a regular and ongoing basis that [are] prepared from a standardized
23
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The Problem: NYC May Not Only Regulate Voluntary
Information

Those subject to the provisions of Regulation 81.50
immediately responded with protest.30 The law “was met with
vigorous objection from . . . restaurants and prompted many to
stop voluntarily making such information available.”31 The New
York State Restaurant Association (NYSRA) brought a lawsuit
against the Board of Health32 challenging Regulation 81.50 on
several grounds, including that it was preempted by a federal
law, the NLEA.33 In a decision issued on September 11, 2007,
Judge Richard Howell of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York awarded judgment in favor
of the NYSRA.34 The court held that Regulation 81.50 was
preempted by the NLEA as it only mandated disclosure of
calorie information from restaurants and other FSEs that
voluntarily posted nutrition information, which “amounted to a
‘voluntary nutrient content claim,’ a category of disclosure that
no state can regulate as mandated by the preemption
provisions of the NLEA.”35
The opinion concluded with obvious disappointment.
The court stated that it understood the “wisdom of Regulation
81.50” and it believed this type of health-reform legislation
would be successful in combating obesity and other publichealth concerns.36 Although the NYC law was ultimately ruled
unconstitutional, the court subtly encouraged the Board of
Health to adopt a new regulatory approach that would fall
within the small, unpreempted gap of the NLEA.37

recipe” and did not regulate “[n]on-standard items, including daily specials and
experimental items.” Id.
30
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2009).
31
Id.
32
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 363.
35
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 517-18.
36
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
37
Id.

2011]

C.

THE RULES OF CONSUMPTION

1055

The Solution: A New and Improved Piece of Legislation

The Board of Health got the message, and on January
22, 2008, it enacted the current version of Regulation 81.50.38
Providing the same reasoning as it had for its original attempt,
NYC again cited the local prevalence of two health-related
epidemics, obesity and diabetes, and the need for this
legislative health reform.39 The specific mandate of the revised
Regulation 81.50 provided that all restaurants and FSEs in
NYC with fifteen or more locations nationally, operating under
the same name and offering the same fare on their menus,
were subject to regulation.40 The new version of Regulation
81.50 provided a more “flexible” rule of disclosure than the
repealed regulation.41
The Board of Health also highlighted that, in recent
years, consumers have been eating outside of their homes more
often, facilitated by the proliferation of restaurant chains and

38

N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF
ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 81.50 OF THE NEW YORK CITY
HEALTH CODE 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION 2], available at http://www.
nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art81-50-0108.pdf (“[T]he Federal
court clearly affirmed the authority of local governments to mandate that restaurants
disclose nutritional information.”); see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health,
556 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2009); Gizzi, supra note 7, at 518 (“[T]he New York City Board
of Health voted to adopt a new bill to require menu-labeling, this time applying the
provision to all New York chain restaurants, not just those that already provide nutrition
information to the public.”); Diane Cardwell, City Tries Again to Require Restaurants to
Post Calories, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at B2.
39
NOTICE OF ADOPTION 2, supra note 38, at 2-4 (discussing the epidemics and
noting that “diabetes has more [than] doubled in New York City in the past decade,
and hospitalizations for long-term complications of diabetes have been rising steadily”).
40
Id. at 10. “Fifteen was found to be an appropriate cut-off to focus on chains
with standardized menus, and will cover the vast majority of such chain restaurant
locations.” Id.
41
Id. at 11 (“The reenacted rule . . . provides one, more flexible standard for
displaying calorie information, incorporating the lessons learned by the [Board of
Health] from its analysis of many proposed alternative designs and its discussions with
industry representatives. All of the alternative design elements that were considered
approvable have been incorporated into the reenacted rule.”). The current standard can
be summed up as follows:
Calorie information will have to be displayed as prominently as either the
menu item’s name or price . . . . [and] will also be provided on item tags
where food is displayed. . . . This rule mandates posting only of calories, the
single most important piece of nutrition information, at the point of selection.
FSEs are, of course, not . . . precluded from providing additional nutrition
information voluntarily. . . . [and] are also free to add disclaimers about
possible slight variations from listed calorie content.
Id.
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FSEs serving easily attainable and inexpensive food.42 Since
most consumers are not knowledgeable about the nutritional
information of the menu items they purchase for consumption,
nor are they likely to accurately estimate the caloric content of
these items, NYC once again stressed that without Regulation
81.50, its residents would continue to practice uninformed
nutritional decision-making and gain weight.43 NYC specifically
emphasized the “calorie information gap. . . . contributing to
people choosing higher calorie items” and that providing such
information “in a time, place, and manner that can inform
decisions will help bridge this gap.”44 NYC concluded its new
proposal by providing information based on statistics and local
polls, which displayed remarkable results.45 For example,
consumers with the calorie information of menu items at the
point of purchase tended to consume approximately fifty less
calories than those without that information, and also selected
items with almost 100 fewer calories than their original menu
choices.46 As these results showed a dramatic decrease in caloric
consumption, it followed that the new menu calorie-disclosure
law would likely increase the health of NYC citizens. The only
remaining obstacle was whether Regulation 81.50 could
successfully fight another constitutional battle against the
NYSRA.
ROUND II: NYSRA V. N.Y.C. BOARD OF HEALTH

III.

The NYSRA again challenged Regulation 81.50 in
court. This time, however, the NYSRA was not met with the
same favorable result. The following section discusses the
NYSRA’s undersupported preemption challenge, meritless
First Amendment claim, and failed arguments that the court
should review the issue using a higher level of scrutiny.48
47

42

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 5 (“[T]he systematic underestimation of calories suggests that
consumers have distorted perceptions of calorie content and de facto have been misled
to view oversized, high-calorie portions as ‘normal’ portions, containing acceptable
numbers of calories.”).
44
Id. at 6.
45
Id. at 6-7.
46
Id. at 7.
47
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 545 F. Supp. 2d 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
48
For other recent discussions of the NYSRA’s unsuccessful second attempt
at challenging Regulation 81.50, see Rodriquez-Dod, supra note 6, at 705-06. See also
Bernell, supra note 6, at 852-61; Jodi Schuette Green, Cheeseburger in Paradise? An
43
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The NYSRA Loses Both of Its Constitutional Claims

On April 18, 2008, Judge Howell issued a decision
upholding the new Regulation 81.50 as constitutional.49 On
June 12, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit heard the NYSRA’s appeal asking the court to
reverse the lower court’s decision.50 On February 17, 2009,
Judge Pooler issued the decision of the court.51
1. Preemption or Not Preemption? That Was the
Question
The first of the two bases the NYSRA used to challenge
Regulation 81.50 was preemption by the NLEA. According to
the Supreme Court, in order to determine whether federal law
preempts a state regulation, a court should completely concern
itself with the legislative purpose and goal of the federal Act.52
There are several ways for a court to detect whether a
preemption problem exists. One, “[c]onflict preemption,” is
present when “‘compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility,’” or a “state law ‘stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”53 Thus, in analyzing
whether conflict preemption was present in this case, the
Second Circuit had the difficult task of determining whether
the new Regulation 81.50 clashed with the NLEA in such a
way that made it inherently unconstitutional. Throughout nine
pages of detailed discussion, Judge Pooler upheld the law as
constitutional.54
The NLEA “amended the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act” (FFDCA), and dictated that all food sold for
human consumption must include “a nutrition label with

Analysis of How New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of
Health May Reform Our Fast Food Nation, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 746-65 (2010).
49
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 365, 369.
50
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
51
Id. at 114, 117.
52
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (noting that
the “question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of
congressional intent” (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985))).
53
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 276 (5th ed. 2005)
(quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
54
See generally N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 123-31.
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specified nutrients and other information.”55 The intent of the
NLEA was to “clarify and to strengthen the Food and Drug
Administration’s legal authority to require nutrition labeling
on foods, and to establish the circumstances under which
claims may be made about nutrients in foods.”56 Although the
purpose of the NLEA and its accompanying requirements seem
straightforward, the Second Circuit declared it “a labyrinth.”57
The court suggested that determining whether a preemption
issue was present was a tricky endeavor, especially because the
implementing agency regulations were somewhat inconsistent
with the NLEA.58
First, looking directly at the text of the NLEA, the court
narrowed the focus of its opinion by noting that the foundation
for preemption questions arose from two specific sections.59
Section 343(q), “entitled ‘nutrition information,’” discusses
information that must be made available and mandates that
“basic nutrition facts” be indicated on the label of most food
items sold for human consumption.60 Section 343(r), “entitled
‘[n]utrition levels and health-related claims,’” discusses
information that a seller may choose to volunteer on the
nutrition label of its food products regarding any health
benefits or nutrients in that item.61 Restaurants like the
members of the NYSRA do not fall within the scope of this
federal law, and thus do not have to display nutrition
information of the food they serve.62 However, according to
these NLEA sections, if a restaurant or FSE deliberately and
voluntarily chooses to display not just the bare bones calorie
55

Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The
Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 297 (2006) (citing
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2004))).
56
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 520 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-538 at 7 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3337).
57
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 117.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 118 (noting that Sections 343(q) and (r) “are the statutory bases from
which the preemption questions in this case stem”); see also Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 343(q), (r) (2004)).
60
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 118; see also 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1).
61
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 119; see also 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1).
62
See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i); see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 118
(“Restaurants, NYSRA’s membership, are exempt from Section 343(q)’s mandatory
nutrition information labeling requirements; they do not have to attach a Nutrition Facts
panel to food they serve.”). “[T]he NLEA does not regulate nutrition information labeling
on restaurant food, and states and localities are free to adopt their own rules.” Id. at 120.
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information of food products, but also information on health
value and nutritional content of its offered fare, then it must
conform to both sections.63
The court also looked at the language of the
supplementary agency regulations passed in accordance with
the NLEA.64 It found that a distinction was drawn between
nutrition information and nutrition claims, with the former
open to expansion by state and local legislation, while the
latter is completely preempted by the NLEA.65 Consequently,
the Second Circuit had to decide if the numerical calorie
disclosures required by Regulation 81.50 of NYC restaurants
and FSEs on their menus and menu boards are preempted
“claims” under Section 343(r) of the NLEA, or unpreempted
“nutrition information” under Section 343(q) of the federal
law.66
On one hand, the court found that the NLEA defined
“nutrition information” to mean objective reports, displaying
simply the numerical quantity of calories in a food item.67 On
the other hand, the NLEA characterized “claims” as being
subjective statements on food labels or other branding criteria
that in any way, explicitly or implicitly, depict a level of
nutrients or are related to the overall health benefits offered by
the food product.68 Therefore, in most cases, it would be obvious
to a court when a state or local law regulated objective or
63

N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 120 (“When a restaurant chooses to
characterize the level of any nutrient which is of the type required by Section 343(q) to
be in the label or labeling of the food, it must conform to Section 343(r)’s requirements.”
(citation omitted)). “The NLEA, however, does generally regulate nutrition content
claims on restaurant foods, and states and localities may only adopt rules that are
identical to those provided in the NLEA.” Id.
64
Specifically, two of the agency regulations, 343-1(a)(4) and 343-1(a)(5), were
passed as counterparts to the two aforementioned NLEA sections, and exist to further
dictate the scope of the NLEA’s preemption on state and local legislation. See N.Y. State
Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 120. The first, 343-1(a)(4), relates to NLEA Section 343(q) and
“preempts any state or local requirement for nutrition labeling of food that is not identical
to the requirement of section 343(q), except a requirement for nutrition labeling of food
which is exempt (i.e. restaurant exception).” Id. The second, 343-1(a)(5), relates to NLEA
Section 343(r) and explicitly “preempts state or local governments from imposing any
requirement on nutrient content claims made by a food purveyor in the label or labeling
of food that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(r).” Id.
65
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 123.
66
Id.
67
See 21 U.S.C § 343(q)(1)(c) (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(1) (2006); see also
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 124.
68
See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 124-25. The agency regulation
describes “calorie content claims” to include “calorie free, free of calories . . . without
calories, trivial source of calories, negligible source of calories, [and] dietarily
insignificant source of calories.” 21 C.F.R. § 101.60(b)(1) (2006).
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subjective labeling of foods, and thus whether such legislation
is preempted.69 In this case, the type of menu labeling
information controlled by Regulation 81.50 was neither
confusing nor ambiguous.70 The court determined that Section
343(r) provided that
in order for a Section 343(q)-type statement not to be a claim . . . it
must appear with the other information required or permitted by the
NLEA for packaged food, or applicable state or local law for
restaurant food, which here, would be that required by Regulation
81.50—the total number of calories.71

Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the NLEA did not
preempt the current version of Regulation 81.50, as it only
mandated the disclosure of “quantitative information,”72 but
that the law prohibited any further regulation by the Board of
Health on “nutrient content claims.”73 Accordingly, Regulation
81.50 was upheld as valid, as it merely orders the disclosure of
caloric facts, and nothing else.
2. Freedom of Speech Does Not Mean Freedom to Resist
Speech
The new Regulation 81.50 emerged victorious from the
first challenge, but still faced a second challenge brought under
the First Amendment by the NYSRA. Here too, however, the
Second Circuit held that Regulation 81.50 did not violate the
constitutional right of free speech.
a. First Amendment Background
The court found that because restaurants are
commercial entities, the type of speech they engage in is
69

N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 120 (“[S]tates are not preempted from
adopting nutrition information labeling laws as defined by Section 343(q), but are
preempted from adopting nutrient claim laws as defined by Section (r).”).
70
See Richard J. Wegener, Calorie Information on Fast-Food Menus? Court
Upholds NYC Menu Labeling Law, FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A. (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.fredlaw.com/articles/marketing/mark_0902_rjw.html (“The court concluded
that calorie displays are more accurately termed ‘information,’ and that federal law
does not preempt states from legislating with respect to such information in
restaurants.”).
71
N.Y. State Rest Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 127-28.
72
Id. at 124.
73
Id. at 123 (“The NLEA does not preempt New York City from adopting its
own requirements for nutrition information labeling . . . but it does generally preempt
it from adopting different rules for nutrient content claims.”).
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commercial speech.74 Thus, a restaurant or FSE may challenge
legislation it believes conflicts with its First Amendment
commercial speech rights.75 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that the First Amendment protects the
inverse of the right to speak: the right not to speak.76
Nevertheless,
even
though
the
First
Amendment
unquestionably protects commercial speech, the protection
offered is less extensive than the speech rights afforded to
noncommercial speech.77 Yet, the inquiry does not end with the
conclusion that the speech affected is commercial speech, as
different levels of protection are given to commercial entities
based on the type of speech regulated.78
The Second Circuit had previously held that the test
used for regulations of commercial speech is “the more
permissive means-ends test from Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”79 In
addition, the Second Circuit had found that the rational basis
test applies when evaluating commercial speech disclosure
laws.80 In Zauderer, the Court recognized that there exist
“material
differences
between
purely
factual
and
uncontroversial disclosure requirements and outright
prohibitions on speech,” and that “[r]egulations that compel
purely factual and uncontroversial commercial speech are
subject to more lenient review than regulations that restrict
accurate commercial speech.”81 Applying this holding to the
current challenge brought before it, the Second Circuit
74

Id. at 131 (“As commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial
transaction [and] Regulation 81.50 requires disclosure of calorie information in
connection with a proposed commercial transaction—the sale of a restaurant meal, the
form of speech affected . . . is clearly commercial speech.” (citation omitted)).
75
Keane, supra note 55, at 307 (“A food producer may also challenge a
government-mandated food label on the ground that it conflicts with his free speech
rights under the First Amendment.”).
76
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see also
Keane, supra note 55, at 307.
77
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 626, 637 (1985); see
also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S 557, 562-63 (1980)
(“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
78
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132.
79
Keane, supra note 55, at 311; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
80
Rules “mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial information”
are subject to the rational basis test. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104,
114-15 (2d Cir. 2001).
81
Id. at 113.
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subjected Regulation 81.50 to rational basis review, found that
a reasonable relationship existed between the new law and its
intended purpose, and accordingly gave its condolences to the
NYSRA.82
b. The Push for Heightened Scrutiny
In a final effort to save its case, the NYSRA argued that
the Second Circuit should apply strict scrutiny, rather than a
rational basis review, as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
since Zauderer has increasingly recognized greater protection
of commercial speech.83 The NYSRA further contended that the
holding in Zauderer is limited to misleading commercial
speech, and exists merely as a jurisprudential effort to prevent
deception.84 Thus, the NYSRA urged the court to designate
Zauderer as jurisprudence limited to the sphere of unreliable
commercial speech.85 It argued that “calories are not inherently
dangerous” and because “people cannot survive without
consuming calories,” the issue should receive a different
standard of review.86 The NYSRA reasoned that the Board of
Health did nothing more than assert its point of view in
Regulation 81.50—that calories are dangerous—and that this
distinguishes it from what has previously been allowed in
mandatory disclosure laws based on factual information.87
In contrast, the Board of Health argued that Regulation
81.50 is completely based on objective facts that even the
members of the NYSRA agree with: the calorie content

82

N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 134 (“[A]ccordingly, rational basis
applies and NYSRA concedes that it will not prevail if we apply that test.”).
83
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 43, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of
Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1892) (“The rational basis standard is not
consistent with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, which recognizes
robust protection of commercial speech and has consistently forbidden forced
communication by a private citizen of a governmental message.”).
84
Id. at 44 (“In the many years since Zauderer, the . . . Court has never
applied the rational basis standard to non-misleading commercial speech. Indeed, in
United Foods—decided 16 years after Zauderer—the Court expressly rejected the wider
application of rational basis review as urged by the [Board of Health] here and limited
the Zauderer standard to laws necessary to prevent deception.”); see also Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 651 (upholding the speech restriction and finding that “an advertiser’s rights
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
85
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 47, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114.
86
Id.
87
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 38, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114.
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information that they were being forced to disclose.88 The Board
of Health noted that the NYSRA only disagreed with providing
such information.89
Ultimately, the Second Circuit agreed90 with the Board
of Health that the NYSRA’s argument was “completely
meritless,” because the posting of factual information alone
could never be understood as an expression of an opinion.91
c. Applying Rational Basis
Unconvinced by the argument for heightened scrutiny,
the court applied the Zauderer rational-basis test.92 As
expected, the Second Circuit held that NYC “has plainly
demonstrated a reasonable relationship between the purpose of
Regulation 81.50’s disclosure requirements and the means
employed to achieve that purpose.”93 The court credited NYC’s
stated purposes for the legislation in the Notice of Adoption: to
increase consumer awareness of the calorie content of menu
items and influence point of purchase decisions.94
The court also found that hard facts and a guarantee of
the regulation’s success did not need to be shown at this point,
thus recognizing that the Board of Health was not obligated to
support its legislation with “evidence or empirical data to
sustain rationality.”95 Rather, NYC’s findings regarding
consumption habits of its citizens when eating outside of the
home provided enough of a rational basis for Regulation 81.50.96
Citing the Notice of Adoption, the court said that these findings
clearly and sufficiently displayed that
the obesity epidemic is mainly due to excess calorie consumption,
often resulting from meals eaten away from home. Americans . . . are
eating out more than in the past and when doing so, typically eat
88

Id. at 36. “Here, the inclusion of factual information on the menu conveys
no point of view.” Id. at 38 (“Informing the public about safe toxin disposal is nonideological; it involves no ‘compelled recitation of a message’ and no ‘affirmation of
belief.’” (citing Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 850 (9th Cir. 2003))).
89
Id. at 36.
90
See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132-34.
91
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 38-39, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114.
92
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F. 3d at 134.
93
Id.
94
Id. (“Citing what it termed an ‘obesity epidemic,’ New York City enacted
Regulation 81.50 to: (1) reduce consumer confusion and deception; and (2) to promote informed
consumer decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associate with it.”).
95
Id. at 134 n.23 (quoting Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F. 3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001)).
96
Id. at 135.
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more than they do at home, and in just one meal ordered in a fast
food restaurant, might consume more than the advised daily caloric
intake.97

Further, the court explained that these findings and
observations were not only made by NYC, but also recognized
in reports commissioned by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the Center for Disease Control, and the United States
Department of Agriculture.98 In light of this substantial support
for the goals and purpose of Regulation 81.50,99 the court held
that the menu calorie-disclosure mandate was rationally and
reasonably related to its ultimate goal of combating diabetes
and obesity.100
97

Id.; see also NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1, supra note 13, at 3-4.
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 135. “A 2006 FDA-commissioned report
concluded that ‘obesity has become a public health crisis of epidemic proportions.’” Id.
(quoting THE KEYSTONE REPORT, FORUM ON AWAY-FROM-HOME FOODS: OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PREVENTING WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY 4 (2006) [hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT]).
“Another Study concluded that rising obesity rates led to increasing diabetes
rates . . . .” Id. (citing CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
NAT’L DIABETES SURVEILLANCE SYS., PREVALENCE OF DIABETES (1980-2005), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/prev/national/tablepersons.htm). “Further,
studies have linked obesity to eating out. The Keystone Report also concluded that the
consumption of high-calorie meals at fast-food restaurants is a significant cause of
obesity, stating that ‘[e]ating out more frequently is associated with obesity, higher
body fatness, and higher body mass index.’” Id. (quoting KEYSTONE REPORT, supra, at
27). “The United States Department of Agriculture has observed that away-from-home
foods have lower nutritional quality than home foods and found a correlation between
increased caloric intake and eating out.” Id. (citation omitted).
99
Beyond the studies the case discussed, many briefs were filed on behalf of
organizations supporting the Board of Health’s new calorie-disclosure regulation. See
Brief for Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity at Yale University as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees and Arguing for Affirmation at 3-4, N.Y. State Rest.
Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114 (“If NYSRA’s First Amendment arguments are accepted, . . . [t]he
regulatory structure of consumer protection in the United States, which relies heavily
on promoting information transparency to encourage informed consumer decisionmaking, will be thrown into jeopardy, as will the government’s ability to combat the
obesity epidemic through regulations promoting knowledgeable consumer choice and
personal responsibility.”); see also Brief of the FDA as Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance at 2-3, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114 (“Because the Regulation
compels an accurate, purely factual disclosure of the calorie content of restaurant menu
items, and addresses a legitimate state interest in preventing or reducing obesity
among its citizens by making accurate calorie information available to consumers,
there is a rational connection between the disclosure requirement and the City’s
purpose in imposing it such that the Regulation survives constitutional analysis.”); see
generally Brief for U.S. Congressman Henry Waxman et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Appelles and for Affirmance, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114. This extended
support was praised in commentaries following the court decision, including
commendation from the American Medical Association. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Fed
Court Upholds New York City’s Calorie-posting Rule, AM. MEDICAL ASS’N (Mar. 9,
2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/03/09/prsb0309.htm.
100
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 136 (“In view of all the above findings,
Regulation 81.50’s calorie disclosure rules are clearly reasonably related to its goal of
reducing obesity.”).
98
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Regulation 81.50 survived both of the NYSRA’s
constitutional challenges. Eventually, the outcome of these
challenges would prove to be not just a victory for NYC, but for
general public health reform in all of America.
B.

The Aftermath: NYC Inspires the Nation
The Second Circuit best explained the phenomenon:
Now, every time New Yorkers walk into or use the drive-through of
certain chain restaurants, they are informed, for instance, that the
taco salad contains 840 calories, the sausage and egg breakfast
sandwich contains 450 calories, and the premium hamburger
sandwich with mayonnaise contains 670 calories, but without
mayonnaise contains 510 calories.101

And so it began—every NYC resident dining at a regulated
business was forced to face the calorie content of their food
choices in the crucial moment when they decided what to eat.
Once Regulation 81.50 was back in effect, restaurants began
noticing real differences in customers’ ordering choices.102
Newspapers, blogs, and other media sources frequently
reported on the success of the law—its influence quickly
became a popular headline.103 Along with the local attention the
NYC calorie-disclosure law was receiving, other cities and
states also took notice of Regulation 81.50 and its success
against legal challenges.104 Consequently, these cities and states
began drafting, enacting, and implementing their own caloriedisclosure legislation.105

101

Id. at 121; see also Schulman, supra note 6, at 598 (stating if “the goal of
menu-labeling is to influence the dietary decisions of a wide range of consumers, merely
making nutritional information available somewhere is not enough” and discussing how
consumers must be presented with this information at the point of purchase).
102
See, e.g., New York City Rave Reviews for Menu Labeling, CTR. FOR SCI. IN
THE PUB. INTEREST, http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/nyc_review_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited
Jan. 6, 2011); see also Musings of an Obesity Medicine Doc and Certifiably Cynical
Realist, WEIGHTY MATTERS, http://www.weightymatters.ca/2008/07/proof-nyc-menuboard-calories-change.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Musings]; Ronnie
Caryn Rabin, New Yorkers Try to Swallow Calorie Sticker Shock, 600 Calorie Muffins?
The First City to Adopt Law Faces Unappetizing Surprises, MSNBC.COM (Jul. 16,
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25464987.
103
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 102.
104
See generally State and Local Menu Labeling Policies, http://cspinet.org/
new/pdf/ml_map.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (displaying the various state and local
menu labeling policies either passed, implemented, or introduced as of February 2010).
105
See id.
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1. The Triumph of Regulation 81.50
Residents of NYC noticed the calorie postings and began
to change their eating habits. The transformation started as
early as the first enactment of the calorie-disclosure legislation,
even before the completion of the initial lawsuit challenging its
constitutionality.106 Now, many New Yorkers who see calorie
information on a menu before purchasing fare end up ordering
less caloric food.107 If this diet alteration in favor of healthier,
lower-calorie options already being made by some New Yorkers
continues to gain popularity, it could soon inspire more
residents and start drastically reducing cases of obesity and
diabetes in NYC.108
Journalists, bloggers, and critics wildly reported
positive predictions about the new NYC law,109 addressed how
effective Regulation 81.50 would be in reducing obesity levels
in NYC, and favorably discussed recent independent case
studies.110 For example, in one study conducted shortly after the
first version of Regulation 81.50 was passed, a reporter
interviewed a woman, who was about to order her usual
breakfast, but then noticed the caloric content of her choice.111
She found out that her favorite chocolate chip muffin at
Dunkin’ Donuts had 630 calories.112 This woman told the
reporter that she “was blown away,” and that she did not
expect her “little muffin” to have 630 calories in it.113 Similarly,
another case study documented a reporter watching a table of
women reading menus after sitting down to dine at T.G.I.
Friday’s.114 The reporter noticed that these women, upon seeing
106

See Rabin, supra note 102.
See ACS Supports Calorie Labeling in Albany, N.Y. ACTION CENTER (July,
28, 2009), http://www.acscan.org/action/ny/updates/451 (“In NYC, fast food customers
who saw calorie information displayed purchased 52 fewer calories than those who
didn’t see the information.”). For an example of a menu displaying caloric information,
see Menus & Menu Boards with Nutrition Information, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB.
INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/menulabeling/boards.html (last visited Jan 6, 2011).
108
See Menu Labeling Laws—Sweeping The Nation?, FIRST MOVERS (Feb. 22,
2009), http://firstmovers.blogspot.com/2009/02/menu-labeling-laws-sweeping-nation_22.
html [hereinafter FIRST MOVERS] (“[T]he New York City Department of Health
projected that menu labeling in the City will prevent at least 30,000 new cases of
diabetes in the next five years.”).
109
See, e.g., Musings, supra note 102; see also Rabin, supra note 102.
110
See Musings, supra note 102; see also Rabin, supra note 102.
111
Rabin, supra note 102.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
107
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the caloric content of the menu items, wore identical
expressions of shock and disgust.115 Following their appalling
discovery of the actual caloric content in most menu choices,
the reporter recalled that two of the women “asked about the
suddenly popular Classic Sirloin—at 290 calories, it was one of
the lowest calorie items on the menu—but learned the
restaurant ran out by the time the dinner rush started.”116 As
the information in these case studies indicates, many NYC
consumers are making healthier, lower calorie food choices.
Because of this, it was greatly anticipated that other states
would soon follow suit. 117
2. Adoption of Similar Laws Elsewhere
As was predicted, NYC is no longer alone in forcing
disclosure of calorie content on menus. With the similarly
stated purpose of combating the national epidemics of obesity
and diabetes in their own states or cities, legislatures around
the United States followed suit and adopted different caloriedisclosure regulations.118 Thus, “[w]hat once seemed like the farfetched idea of a health-nut legislator” was no longer
considered so extreme, as “state and local menu-labeling laws
[went] into effect all over the country, forcing many in the
restaurant industry to comply with their parameters.” 119
New laws have been enacted from coast to coast by both
state and local legislatures. Just as NYC was the first city to
enact a menu calorie-disclosure law,120 California became the
first state to do so.121 Unfortunately, however, the success of
Regulation 81.50 did not influence everyone. Some states, like
Georgia and Ohio, took the opposite route and passed
legislation that ensures their state and local governments
115

Id.
Id. In comparison, the reporter noted that “Friday’s pecan-crusted chicken
salad, served with mandarin oranges, dried cranberries and celery, has 1,360 calories.” Id.
117
See, e.g., Wegener, supra note 70.
118
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 502 (“In an effort to combat the obesity epidemic,
certain states and local governments have proposed or passed legislation requiring
chain restaurants to post nutrition information alongside item prices on menus or
menu boards.”); see also Nutrition Labeling in Chain Restaurants, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE
PUB. INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/nutritionpolicy/MenuLabelingBills2007-2008.
pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
119
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 514.
120
See FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108.
121
See California First State in Nation to Pass Menu Labeling Law, CTR. FOR
SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/new/200809301.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2011); see also Gizzi, supra note 7, at 516.
116
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would never support menu calorie-disclosure laws.122 The
governments that followed NYC’s lead have adopted various
types of calorie-disclosure laws, some stricter than Regulation
81.50 and some more lenient.123 Many of these proposed bills
and passed laws contained similar menu labeling requirements
as Regulation 81.50, regulating disclosure only in restaurants
and FSEs with a certain amount of locations nationally.124
Similarly, many states utilize a different measuring approach,
applying only to restaurants and FSEs with a specific number
of locations statewide, rather than nationwide.125 Further, while
Regulation 81.50 merely requires disclosure of caloric
information, other state laws require disclosure of additional
nutrient information, such as fat content.126
As local and state legislatures increasingly adopted
more calorie-disclosure bills, the burden on restaurants and
FSEs with locations across the United States was bound to
increase. These national and regional chains already had
dozens of laws to comply with,127 sometimes even varying within
the same state.128 As nutrition disclosure laws multiply, so too

122

See Restaurant Industry Successes in Menu Board/Calorie Posting Wars,
NOWPUBLIC.COM, http://www.nowpublic.com/health/restaurant-industry-successes-menuboard-calorie-posting-wars (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
123
For examples of laws that are more strict than Regulation 81.50, see KINGS
CNTY., WASH. BD. OF HEALTH CODE, ch. 5.10.015 (2008) (“The nutrition labeling of food
shall include, but not be limited to, the total number of calories; . . . [t]otal number of
grams of saturated fat; . . . carbohydrate; and . . . milligrams of sodium.”). See also
Rabin, supra note 102. For examples of laws that are more lenient, see CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West Supp. 2009). See also California First State in Nation to
Pass Menu Labeling Law, supra note 121.
124
See, e.g., KINGS CNTY., WASH. BD. OF HEALTH CODE, ch. 5.10.015 (stating
that the labeling law requires restaurants with fifteen or more locations nationally to
disclose caloric information).
125
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (stating that the labeling
law requires restaurants with twenty or more locations statewide to disclose caloric
information).
126
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 515.
127
See H.B 54, 24th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007), available at http://www.
capitol.hawaii.gov/session2008/bills/HB54.htm (regulating ten or more establishments); S.F.
2158 82nd Gen. Assem., 2008 Sess. (Iowa 2008) (regulating twenty-one or more locations
within the state); S.B. 211, 2008 Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008) (regulating twenty or
more locations statewide); S.B. 1290, 185th Gen. Court, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass. 2007)
(regulating ten or more locations across the United States); A. 1407, 213th Leg. 2008
Sess. (N.J. 2009) (regulating twenty or more locations in New Jersey); A. 729, 2007 State.
Assemb., 2007 Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (regulating fifteen or more locations nationally as well as
five locations in New York); see also Gizzi, supra note 7, at 515 n.104; State and Local
Menu Labeling Policies, supra note 104.
128
See generally State and Local Menu Labeling Policies, supra note 104.
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does the cost of compliance for these restaurants.129 As a result,
“[i]f even a portion of [the pending legislations in various cities
and states] eventually pass, [these laws would] significantly
affect interstate commerce.”130 Thus, absent the national
mandate to preempt these local and state laws, the cost of a
meal at regulated restaurants and FSEs would likely increase,
as these businesses would need to find new ways to carry the
greater financial burden of compliance. To mitigate the
financial burden, it became necessary for the federal
government to step in.
IV.

IT WAS THE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR CONGRESS TO PASS
A FEDERAL CALORIE-DISCLOSURE LAW

Because of the increasing popularity of menu caloriedisclosure laws, not only do chain restaurants and other FSEs
have no choice whether or not to share nutrition information,
or how to convey that information, but they now also have to
comply with a variety of special requirements that are
particular to each jurisdiction.131 As a result of this
jurisdictional issue, it became even more important for
Congress to recognize that “the most effective route to fighting
obesity . . . [is] old-fashioned ‘command and control’ federal
legislation, given the national government’s ability and
arguable obligation to improve Americans’ food supply, lifestyle
habits, and education about the health risks of obesity.”132
A.

Previous Attempts Were Failures

A federal menu calorie-disclosure law had been
contemplated for some time.133 Actually, proponents of the
NLEA were willing to enact a national calorie-labeling
129

See Kim Leonard, Calorie Disclosure in Store for Food Chains, PITTSBURGH
TRIB. REV. (Jul. 2, 2010), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/
s_688598.html.
130
See Gizzi, supra note 7, at 519.
131
See id. at 527 (“Now, not only will restaurants be unable to choose the
method by which they convey nutrition information to customers, but they will also
have to follow the requirements of various jurisdictions.”).
132
Burnett, supra note 8, at 414; see also Edieth Y. Wu, McFat—Obesity,
Parens Patriae, and the Children, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 569 (2004) (stating that
childhood obesity is a huge problem and that our federal government should be the one
to do something about it).
133
For recent discussions on prior federal attempts at a menu caloriedisclosure law, see Green, supra note 48, at 740-45. See also Devon E. Winkles,
Weighing the Value of Information, 59 EMORY L.J. 549, 551-54 (2009).
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requirement for restaurant and FSE menus as early as 1990.134
The law did not come to fruition as “the restaurant industry
lobbied vehemently against such a regulatory burden” and,
ultimately, “Congress compromised and provided restaurants
certain exemptions to the labeling requirements of [the NLEA],
concluding that the federal government should be cautious
when intervening in the states’ right to protect the health and
safety of their citizens.”135
Though this area was within states’ police powers, there
was no widely recognized purpose or need to burden
restaurants with the national menu labeling regulation, and
the idea for the federal menu calorie-disclosure law was soon
forgotten. Almost twenty years later, and now clearly faced
with a desperate need and purpose for such a federal law—as
obesity and diabetes have become national epidemics—
Congress finally had a change of heart.136
The federal bill that ultimately passed was not the first
of its kind; in recent years, both houses made similar attempts.
First, in 2003, both houses introduced the Menu Education And
Labeling Act (MEAL Act) to the 108th Congress.137 The MEAL
Act was designed to “address the lack of readily-accessible
information about fast-food ingredients by requiring restaurant
chains to clearly display the number of calories, grams of
saturated fat, and milligrams of sodium in their food.”138 Similar
to Regulation 81.50, public interest groups praised the MEAL

134

Gizzi, supra note 7, at 522 (citing LAURA SIMS, THE POLITICS OF FAT: FOOD
200 (1998)).
135
Id.; see also 136 CONG. REC. H5840 (1990).
136
Burnett, supra note 8, at 366 (“Legislation in the House and Senate that
would have a positive effect on America’s obesity epidemic, to the extent such laws
have been proposed, has almost always been unsuccessful.”).
137
See Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003); see
also S. 2108, 108th Cong. (2003).
138
Burnett, supra note 8, at 366; see also H.R. 5563, 109th Cong. (2006); S.
3484, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2108, 108th Cong. (2003).
Also noting the requirements of the MEAL Act, one blogger stated that the
AND NUTRITION POLICY IN AMERICA

bill exempts condiments, items placed on a table or counter for general use,
daily specials, temporary menu items, and irregular menu items.
Interestingly, the bill would also require restaurants that sell self-serve food,
such as through salad bars or buffet lines, to place a sign that lists the
number of calories per standard serving adjacent to each item, and would
require vending machine operators to provide a conspicuous sign disclosing
the number of calories to each item.
FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108.
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Act and the restaurant industry despised it.139 The restaurant
industry focused its protests against an intentional gap in the
federal legislation, which gave states the option to regulate the
disclosure of more information than the law required.140 This
first attempt at a federal menu calorie labeling law was strict—
perhaps too strict—and for this reason it died in committee in
the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses.141
Then, in September 2008, the Senate introduced the
Labeling Education And Nutrition Act (LEAN Act) to the 110th
Congress.142 This also never became more than a bill.143 Refusing
to accept defeat, both houses, as recently as March 2009,
reintroduced companion LEAN Acts to the 111th Congress.144
This proposed legislation
look[ed] to expand current packaged food labeling law to require a
uniform national nutrition labeling standard for chain [FSEs], while
providing a reasonable range of flexibility for the restaurant. While
the LEAN Act would require a uniform national nutrition standard,
the law also would provide for a single set of guidelines in [sic] how
nutrition information is calculated and will provide legal protection
for those restaurants that abide by the law. As larger chain
restaurants with standard menus and standard methods of
preparation are better situated to meet such requirements, the
LEAN Act would apply only to chains with 20 or more units.145

139

See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4-10, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v.
N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1892); see also FIRST MOVERS,
supra note 108.
140
FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108.
141
See Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h3444: (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); see also H.R.
3895:MEAL Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3895 (last visited Jan.
8, 2011); Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 5563, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h5563: (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); Bill Summary and
Status, S. 3484, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?
d109:SN03484: (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); Bill Summary and Status, S. 2108, 108th Cong.
(2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:s2108: (last visited Feb. 6,
2011).
142
Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2008, S. 3575, 110th Cong. (2008).
143
See H.R. 1398, 111th Cong. (2009); see also S. 558, 111th Cong. (2009); Bill
Summary and Status, H.R. 1398, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01398:|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|; Bill Summary
and Status, S. 558, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?
d111:SN00558:|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|.
144
Also, the National Restaurant Association has urged members of Congress
to co-sponsor the LEAN Act of 2008. See Public Policy Issue Briefs, NAT’L RESTAURANT
ASSOC., http://www.restaurant.org/government/issues/issue.cfm?Issue=menulabel (last
visited Jan. 8, 2011).
145
Jim Coen, Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2008 (LEAN Act), DDIFO
(Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.ddifo.org/labeling-education-and-nutrition-act-of-2008-lean-act/;
see also Evan Goodman, Something’s Gotta Give, But What Will It Take?, FULL SPECTRUM
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As the LEAN Act was less demanding than its predecessor, the
MEAL Act, it gained support from many different arenas—
including a former dissenter, the National Restaurant
Association (NRA).146 Specifically, one of the reasons for this
newfound support was that this bill was a “compromise,”147 as
the LEAN Act would only regulate the areas of the restaurant
industry that our government needed to control in order to
fight obesity.148 Another reason for the widespread support was
that a lenient national law would be much less burdensome for
restaurants and FSEs than complying with the various laws at
the state and local levels.149 Moreover, as state and local laws
went into effect, patrons were becoming more aware that they
needed to be able to individually access caloric information in
order to make more healthful choices when dining out.150 Still,
even with this tremendous support, the LEAN Act never made
it past committee.151

BLOG (Aug. 24, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://www.spectrumscience.com/blog/2009/08/24/some
thing’s-gotta-give-but-what-will-it-take/#more-595 (“The goal of The LEAN Act is to reduce
caloric intake among restaurant patrons by exposing them to the contents of what they are
eating. Because most people do not know the nutritional value (or lack thereof) in food they
eat when dining out, awareness is a key step towards healthy eating.”).
146
See Parke Wilde, New Advocacy Coalition Backs National Menu Labeling,
U.S. FOOD POL’Y BLOG (June 12, 2009, 10:14 AM), http://usfoodpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/
06/new-advocacy-coalition-backs-national.html; see also FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108
(“Although no federal menu labeling requirements exist, the topic has gained momentum
in recent years, especially now that the National Restaurant Association is actively
supporting the Labeling Education and Nutrition (LEAN) Act, introduced in the 2008
Congressional session.”).
147
Wilde, supra note 146 (“First, the bill is a compromise bill, providing the
restaurant chains with some of their key policy priorities, including preserving a good
deal of flexibility in deciding how to present the information and protection from what
the restaurants describe as ‘frivolous’ lawsuits.”).
148
Goodman, supra note 145 (“[T]he bipartisan LEAN Act of 2009 is designed to
help curb the obesity epidemic by introducing nutrition labeling of food offered for sale in
[FSEs]. . . . [It] calls for accessible, reliable nutrition information to be displayed in chain
restaurants and is a stepping stone on a long path to improving the health of Americans.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
149
Wilde, supra note 146 (“As with other important nutrition labeling policies
in the past, such as the current nutrition facts panel on packaged food, an important
sector of the food industry chose to support a new government policy in return for more
consistent and less burdensome regulation across jurisdictions.”).
150
Goodman, supra note 145 (“[T]he consequences of dining out . . . include
higher intakes of fat, sodium, and soft drinks, and lower intakes of nutrient-dense
foods such as vegetables. . . . [H]alf of Americans’ diets consist of food consumed outside
the home. . . .The LEAN Act is only one potential intervention to help curb the obesity
epidemic in America. This legislation works on the individual level in order to increase
access to information.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151
See H.R. 1398: Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1398 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
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Current Attempt Was Finally a Success

The most recent attempt to implement a federal caloriedisclosure law occurred as this note was being drafted. Our
nation had been experiencing a tremendous push for universal
health reform.152 Thus, incorporated within each of the various
bills drafted by the 111th Congress were menu caloriedisclosure stipulations.153 The decision to include these
provisions was the result of compromise and recognition that
state and local regulations were increasingly developing across
our nation.154 Although the requirements of the federal bill were
not dissimilar to those proposed and enacted at the state and
local level,155 nor were they drastically different than what was
proposed under the LEAN Act, strong alliances formed in favor
of this legislation and groups prepared to lobby for its
enactment.156 In fact, the law’s one-time biggest opponent
became its greatest supporter.157
After many years of protest, the NRA and the “food
police,” a public policy interest group, vocalized their support
for one bill, and publicly declared that a federal mandate would
be the best solution.158 These groups recognized that a single,
consistent standard would lessen the burden on restaurants
and FSEs nationwide.159 A NRA spokesperson stated that the
organization believed that this bill had the most potential to

152

See generally HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov (last visited Jan.

31, 2011).
153

See generally Nationwide Menu Labeling to Be Included in Health Reform,
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (June 10, 2009), http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id
=44028&topicid=1024.
154
See generally Sean Gregory, Fast Food: Would You Like 1,000 Calories
with That?, TIME.COM (June 29, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1905509,00.html (“Spurred by the passage of a slew of state and local menulabeling laws, on June 10 the Senate reached a bipartisan agreement to include a
federal menu-labeling law as part of comprehensive health-care reform.”).
155
See sources cited supra note 127.
156
See generally Jerry Hirsch, Calorie-Listing Bill Spawns Industry Fight,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/03/business/fi-menu3.
157
Id.
158
See id.; see also Public Policy Issue Briefs, supra note 144; Stephanie
Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to Be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business24menu.html (The “measure was approved by
Congress with little public discussion, in part because restaurant chains supported it. They
had spent years fighting such requirements, but they were slowly losing the battle.”).
159
Hirsch, supra note 156 (“The restaurant trade group’s priority is getting rid
of local laws in favor of one national, uniform standard for menu labeling, which it says
will make it easier for the national chains to standardize their menus and policies.”).
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prevent “a patchwork of harmful regulation and legislation”
from springing up all around the country.160
On September 17, 2009, the House of Representatives
released H.R. 3590, formally known as the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).161 After resolving differences
between the chambers, Congress passed the PPACA.162 Finally,
on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the bill into law,
and it became Public Law No. 111-148.163 After all the
amendments, still included in the depths of this law is a menulabeling provision, which like the aforementioned local and
state laws, requires certain restaurants and FSEs to post
calorie information.164
Section 4205 of the PPACA165 was the result of
negotiations with the NRA, which, as noted above, wanted a
solution to the ever-increasing disparities in the laws being
enacted at the state and local levels.166 This provision requires
restaurants and FSEs with twenty or more locations nationally
to provide calorie information at the point-of-purchase for
standard, unchanging food items, and to post this information
in an obvious and unambiguous manner next to the name of
each item on menus.167 Thus, this provision does not apply to
items that are temporarily offered as a daily special, items that
are not listed on the establishment’s menus such as condiments
or custom orders, items offered on a menu for sixty days or less,
nor items that are part of a traditional market test lasting less

160

Id.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, TAXATION TIMES (Mar. 3,
2010), http://www.taxationtimes.com/2010/124-stat-119/#history [hereinafter TAXATION
TIMES Article]; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205 (2010), Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
162
TAXATION TIMES Article, supra note 161.
163
Id.; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b).
164
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b).
165
For a recent, more detailed discussion of the creation and requirements of
section 4205, see Michelle I. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling
Law and Lessons from Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 904-07 (2010). See
also Bernell, supra note 6, at 865-67.
166
See Margie King, New Federal Health Care Reform Legislation Requires
Calorie Disclosure on Menus, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 30 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.
examiner.com/nutrition-in-philadelphia/new-federal-health-care-reform-legislation-requirescalorie-disclosure-on-menus.
167
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b); see also Schulman,
supra note 6, at 608 (stating that restaurants will have to offer calorie information for
these menu items “on menus, menu boards, and drive-through menus”).
161
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than ninety days.168 The law also exempts small businesses
from regulation.169
Different from Regulation 81.50, the PPACA also
requires that these establishments post on their menus a sort
of warning statement, notifying customers of the suggested
daily caloric intake.170 In addition, the law requires restaurants
to clearly inform customers that if they are interested in
knowing additional or more detailed nutritional information
about each standard menu item, it will be made available to
them upon request.171 Lastly, the law allows restaurants that do
not fall under its purview to voluntarily disclose calories on
their menus.172
Ultimately, section 4205 will be enforced by the FDA.173
In August, 2010, the FDA released both a draft guidance
document describing implementation of certain portions of the
law, and a final guidance document describing the effect the
federal law will have on state and local laws already in
existence.174 In these plans, the FDA recognized that the
“industry may need additional information and time to comply
with the new provisions” and that it expected “to refrain from
enforcement action for a time period that will be provided in
the guidance once it is finalized.”175 After this announcement,
the FDA was expected to begin enforcing this mandate before
2011.176 More importantly, the law requires that the FDA offer
its final proposal for implementation of this regulation by
168

Schulman, supra note 6, at 608.
See id.; see also Jean Spencer, Menu Measure: Health Bill Requires Calorie
Disclosure, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/03/22/menumeasure-health-bill-requires-calorie-disclosure.
170
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b); see also
Schulman, supra note 6, at 608.
171
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b).
172
See id.
173
See King, supra note 166; see also Banker, supra note 165, at 906 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“The statute also directs the FDA to consider a variety of
potentially thorny practical issues while drafting regulations, including
standardization of recipes and methods of preparation, reasonable variation in serving
size and formulation of menu items, space on menus and menu boards, inadvertent
human error, training of food service workers, and variations in ingredients. . . . [and]
to specify the format and manner of the nutrient labels.”).
174
See id.
175
Id. The FDA also asked the public to comment on what it believed would be
a reasonable amount of time before demanding compliance. See id.
176
See, e.g., Client Advisory, FDA Moving Quickly to Enforce New Calorie
Labeling Requirements for Restaurant Menus and Vending Machines, KELLEY DRYE (Oct.
5, 2010), http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/client_advisories/0597 [hereinafter Kelley
Drye Client Advisory].
169
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March 23, 2011.177 By the time this note went to press, however,
the FDA still had not set forth any proposals.
Nevertheless, the law has been enacted, and although it
may take some time,178 our nation is gearing up for the
enforcement of national menu calorie disclosure.179 Congress
has finally passed legislation that preempts almost all future
menu calorie-disclosure regulations on the state and local level,
and makes many existing regulations, including Regulation
81.50, ineffective and void.180
C.

Potential Legal Challenges to the Federal Law

Although most commentators have supported section
4205 of the PPACA,181 the adoption of this national caloriedisclosure law will still likely meet many forms of criticism.
Since it was signed into law, the efficacy of this provision has
already been criticized in some journal and law review articles
for a variety of reasons, ranging from the fact that it does not
include smaller restaurants within the scope of regulation to
the fact that it only makes calorie-disclosure compulsory and
does not require disclosure of other important information such
177

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b); Banker, supra note
165, at 906 (“The statute gives the FDA a one year time limit to promulgate
regulations for implementing its provisions and requires the agency to submit a
quarterly report to Congress regarding the status of proposed regulations.”); see also
Kelley Drye Client Advisory, supra note 176.
178
Spencer, supra note 169 (“The [FDA] needs to come up with regulations, and as
a result, many Americans won’t likely see calories disclosures for three to four years.”); but
see generally FDA Expects to Issue Menu Labeling Proposal by March 23, NAT’L REST. ASS’N,
http://www.restaurant.org/nra_news_blog/2011/01/fda-expects-to-issue-menu-labelingproposal-by-march-23.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011); Andy Hodges, Fast Food Calories News
Reveals Health Care Restaurant Law, NEWSOXY (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.newsoxy.com/
fast-food/calories-news-12833.html (“If a legal battle ensues, as often happens with new
federal regulations, the effect date could conceivably be years away.”).
179
Claire E. Castles, For 500 Additional Calories, Do You Still Want Fries
With That?, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Oct. 2010), http://www.abanet.org/health/esource/
Volume7/02/castles.html (“By removing the calorie and nutritional labeling exception
for certain establishments from the federal labeling requirement, the industry may
now rely on a federal standard for compliance with the labeling requirements.”).
180
See Rosenbloom, supra note 158 (“More than a dozen states have been
considering labeling measures or have already passed them, though many have not yet
taken effect. The new legislation overrides many existing laws, though some localities
will be able to continue enforcing rules that are more stringent than the federal
requirements. New York City, for instance, is expected to continue requiring chains
with 15 or more outlets to post nutritional data, compared with the standard of 20
outlets in the federal law.”).
181
See, e.g., Castles, supra note 179 (stating that this national decree will
tremendously “assist in creating healthier communities, improve wellness and prevent
disease”).
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as fat content of food.182 The effectiveness of this law remains to
be seen, and given the recent, inconsistent studies regarding
the value of Regulation 81.50 in NYC, it is clear that it will
take many years before a well-supported argument is
possible.183 At this point, however, it is possible to predict
forthcoming legal challenges to section 4205 of the PPACA.
The lawsuit discussed in Part III of this note indicates
that the federal law would likely survive a First Amendment
challenge,184 but other constitutional challenges can still be
expected.185 First, as some articles have suggested, “litigation
may arise regarding the extent to which [section] 4205
preempts state and local laws.”186 While this note agrees that
such proceedings are inevitable, it is impossible at this point to
determine the success or failure of such claims, as that will
vary based on the specific attributes of the local or state law
being challenged.187 Second, a lawsuit alleging that the federal
calorie-disclosure law is unconstitutional under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment would not likely be successful,
as this provision “targets a large subset of restaurants” and the
government has at the very least a rational basis for the law.188
Lastly, and discussed in some detail below, critics will likely
182

For arguments criticizing the compulsory menu labeling provision, see, for
example, Banker, supra note 165, at 917-21, and Schulman, supra note 6, at 608-09
(stating that the provision is “an excellent start,” but “it does not constitute an ideal
solution to implementing menu-labeling policy on a national level if the goal is to
maximize the policy’s potential impact on the national weight crisis” and that “it
misses an important opportunity for broad menu-labeling implementation by
exempting smaller, non-chain restaurants”).
183
This note does not discuss these studies in detail, as the impact of the new
federal law is tangential to its main argument. For recent articles discussing the
results of each study, see, for example, Schulman, supra note 6, at 599-603; Banker,
supra note 165, at 911-13; Bernell, supra note 6, at 867-70; Sheila Flesichhacker & Joel
Gittelsohn, Carrots or Candy in Corner Stores?: Federal Facilitators and Barriers to
Stocking Healthier Options, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 23, 52 (2010) (“Even though the
menu labeling law is based on a strong public health rationale and founded on
consumer rights, further work is needed to understand the impact these policy changes
have had (e.g. in New York) and will have (e.g. nationwide on consumer behavior,
dietary intakes, and health conditions). Initial research on [Regulation 81.50] found
some positive effects on low-income consumer awareness, but not any significant
impacts on caloric consumption.”).
184
For a more detailed analysis of a potential First Amendment challenge to
the PPACA, see generally Bernell, supra note 6, at 862-63.
185
For another recent discussion of the legal challenges the federal law will
likely face, see id. at 861-64.
186
Banker, supra note 165, at 926.
187
One caveat to this statement is that in general, a preemption challenge
may be successful if the law requires “claims” to be made, and not only “factual
nutritional information.” Bernell, supra note 6, at 861-62.
188
Banker, supra note 165, at 927.
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claim that the law is beyond Congress’s vested power to
regulate interstate commerce.189
Our federal Constitution bestows Congress with the
power to regulate commerce through the Commerce Clause.190
Since this grant of authority, “the . . . Court has extracted the
notion that the Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of
power to Congress to restrict independent state action in order
to promote nationwide free trade.”191 That is, besides its obvious
ability to regulate interstate activities, Congress can regulate
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.192 Here, because of the variety of state and locally
mandated menu calorie-disclosure laws established before the
federal mandate was passed, “the burden on interstate
commerce [was] certain, especially if states continue[d] to
adopt different regulations.”193
Critics will likely argue that the law does not fall within
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Specifically, they will
contend that the states possess a “residuum of power” to create
public health and safety laws, which reflect local concerns,
even if these laws do affect interstate commerce.194 Such state
laws are presumably valid and subject to such regulation
because public health and welfare consistently fall within the
ambit of state authority and are primarily local concerns.195
These critics will reason that Congress is overstepping its
bounds with such legislation and entering into state policepower territory.
However, it is not likely that this challenge would be
successful. Today, the Court’s jurisprudence gives Congress

189

For another recent discussion of the likely commerce clause challenge, see
id. at 927-28.
190
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (“[The Congress shall have power] To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
191
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 507; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 4 (1824)
(where John Marshall first defined “commerce” to mean “intercourse,” and further
explained that the Constitution uses the word “among,” indicating that power to regulate
interstate commerce didn’t extend to commercial activities entirely within a state).
192
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
193
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 525. Moreover, “in giving Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the states, the Commerce Clause impliedly requires the
states to refrain from placing economic barriers between themselves and other states
that would disrupt the unified national economy.” Id. at 504.
194
See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (“[I]n the absence of
conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make
laws governing matters of local concern.”).
195
See id.
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broad power under the Commerce Clause,196 and the disclosure
of calorie content on chain restaurant menus would be an
example of an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. The sales from these regulated businesses
unarguably affect interstate commerce, accounting for billions
of dollars spent by American consumers.197 Moreover, chain
establishments—those restaurants to be affected by such a
regulation—are interstate in nature, as most of these
companies have locations in more than one state.198 Thus, the
burden on these businesses is an interstate one.199 For these
reasons, the Court would likely find Congress well within its
Commerce Clause authority to pass section 4205 of the PPACA.
Further, section 4205 of the PPACA, in fact, decreases a
burden on interstate commerce. Specifically, “[i]f the individual
states [continued to] mandate[] dissimilar sets of rules and
regulations according to their own interests, the nation would
be nothing more than fifty independent countries coexisting
under the guise of one name, each imposing its own taxes and
other economic burdens on the other.”200 Every regulated
restaurant and FSE would have had to follow a variety of
regulations, as each law would be exclusive to its city or state.
For that reason, it is likely that the Court would find that the
Framers of our federal Constitution wanted to circumvent this
type of arduous undertaking by granting supreme Commerce
Clause power to our national Congress.201
Another argument opponents may offer would center on
the federalism theory that the states are the laboratories of

196

See Raich, 545 U.S. 1; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
Elizabeth Young Spivey, Trans Fat: Can New York City Save Its Citizens
from This “Metabolic Poison”?, 42 GA. L. REV. 273, 291 (citing ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST
FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 293 (2002)). “In 2001,
Americans spent more than $110 billion on fast food, more than on higher education or
new cars.” Id.
198
Id.
199
See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
200
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 508; see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 532 (1949) (stating that the national effect would “set a barrier to traffic between
one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal to the price differential, had
been laid upon the thing transported” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
201
Gizzi, supra note 7, at 531 (“This onerous task is precisely what the
Framers sought to avoid by creating a unified republic and vesting the Commerce
Clause power in Congress.”); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523
(1935) (“[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in union and not division.”).
197
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democracy.202 Those who are against the passage of the federal
calorie-disclosure law would posit that the aforementioned
burden on these restaurants is worth the cost. They would
suggest that through varying attempts, the states would
continue to strive for a perfect solution to these life-threatening
epidemics and, ultimately, find a successful one.203 But these
opponents fail to realize that the federal calorie-disclosure law
does not fully rid the states of their authority within this
realm. In fact, although the federal law in its current form
preempts most state and local regulation, those governments
may still pass laws for unregulated restaurants and may also
still have more stringent disclosure requirements than the
federal mandate.204 Accordingly, states may still experiment
with new legislation and be within the broad scope of section
4205 of the PPACA. Thus, although this constitutional
challenge will likely arise, it is unlikely that it will prevail.
V.

WHERE SHOULD CONGRESS DRAW THE LINE?

Americans enjoy being oblivious, so this federally
mandated menu calorie-disclosure law is nothing short of a
nightmare for many. The reality, unfortunately, is that our
increasing national weight gain seems to be directly related to
consistent dining in these regulated establishments, as their
customers are eating not only a greater amount of food than
they would at home, but are eating much unhealthier food as
well.205 Now, in every town, city, and state, American citizens
202

Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1261 (2009) (“Most theories of federalism rest upon an autonomy
model that depicts states as sovereign policymaking enclaves, able to regulate separate
and apart from federal interference. State autonomy helps create laboratories of
democracy, diffuse power, foster choice, safeguard individual rights, and promote
vibrant participatory opportunities for citizens.”).
203
Supporting this argument, in 1932, Justice Brandeis wrote, “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
204
See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see also Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers Regarding the Effect of
Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 on State and
Local Menu and Vending Machine Labeling Laws, FDA.GOV (Aug. 2010), http://www.
fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLa
belingNutrition/ucm223408.htm.
205
For a more detailed discussion of the relative unhealthiness of food
consumed outside the home, see Schulman, supra note 6, at 594-97.
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will have to face the glaring truth of their food choices in these
regulated restaurants and FSEs. Alas, illustrating how this
will impact the American dining experience, one blogger wrote,
The new calorie law is a murderer! Yes, it has killed my pleasure of
eating out! . . . For Gods [sic] sake, who wants to know all this? I
dine out once a week with my family simply for the pleasure of
eating. I’m already savvy on a lot of calorie education, buddy! The
television, newspapers, health journals, slimming spas, doctor’s [sic]
chambers are all bombarding people day in and day out with
information on calories and high and low calorie foods. I really don’t
need to be reminded of all that once more when I’m going to a food
joint to deliberately indulge in my favorite food once in a while.206

But it is exactly this carefree attitude that has led to America’s
unhealthy status. Although many commentators have noted
that magazines, television, and other media sources are
sufficient means to create widespread awareness on high and
low calorie food choices, they have ignored that this method
was practiced for years, without notable success. Likely, the
reason for the failure of those methods is because when
Americans read magazines or watch television they are not
standing in line or sitting at a table, waiting to place an order
for food. When calorie information is on menus, staring patrons
in the face, it cannot be ignored or forgotten.
Just as NYC inspired cities and states across the nation
to adopt calorie-disclosure laws that ultimately led to the
recent federal mandate, it has also inspired local and state
governments to pass other innovative food laws designed to
combat obesity, diabetes, and other life-threatening
epidemics.207 This section addresses three recent NYC foodbased health initiatives in particular. First, NYC, in passing its
trans fat ban,208 was the earliest of many state and local
governments to enact such regulation.209 Second, NYC has

206

Who Cares for the Calorie Law?, IFOOD, http://www.ifood.tv/node/93263
(last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
207
Does New York City’s Trans-Fat Ban Go Too Far?, ALLBUSINESS.COM (Jul.
31, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/medicine-health/diseases-disorders-obesity/148834
38-1.html (“New York City banned the use of trans fats in all restaurants in the city in
2006. Philadelphia, California, Boston and Montgomery County, Md. have subsequently
passed similar bans on the use of trans fats in restaurants.”).
208
N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b) (2008).
209
New York Passes Trans Fat Ban, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 5, 2006, 5:30 PM), http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16051436/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition; see also Trans Fat Bans in
Restaurants, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/transfat/index.
html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
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recently commenced a sodium reduction campaign210 that is also
spreading across the nation.211 Third, NYC has just proposed its
newest initiative: banning the use of food stamps to purchase
sugary drinks.212
While there is a lot of recent criticism that section 4205
of the PPACA does not go far enough, our federal legislature
should be wary of emulating the local and state food laws that
go beyond mere information disclosure. Specifically, Congress
should be careful not to pass laws similar to these other NYC
food-targeting
health-initiatives
that
regulate
actual
consumption. As many commentators have recently questioned
where the legislative line should be drawn,213 this note suggests
that it should be drawn at educational mandates. While all of
NYC’s recent food laws are based on noble public goals, goals
that could decrease the prevalence of obesity, diabetes, and
other life-threatening epidemics in America, this note argues
that some things should not be regulated at all.
A.

Funding the Epidemics

It is no secret that American taxpayers are funding the
growth of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension in America.214 The
hypertension epidemic alone places a gigantic burden on our
210

Cutting Salt, Improving Health, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/
cardio/cardio-salt-initiative.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Cutting Salt].
211
Legal and Policy Resources on Public Health “Winnable Battles,” Sodium
Reduction, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www2a.cdc.gov/
phlp/winnable/sodium_reduction.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2011); see also Tiffany
O’Callaghan, Next on New York’s Health Agenda: Curbing Salt Intake (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://healthland.time.com/2010/01/11/next-on-new-yorks-health-agenda-curbing-saltintake (stating that the campaign “includes public health organizations from several
different cities (including Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Seattle) and
states (including Alaska, Delaware, Michigan, North Carolina, Tennessee).”).
212
See Press Release, News from the Blue Room, Mayor Bloomberg and
Governor Patterson Propose Excluding Sugary Drinks from Food Stamp Purchases in
New York City (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov (follow “News and Press Releases”
hyperlink; then follow “2010 Events” hyperlink; then “October 2010” hyperlink; then
scroll to “October 7, 2010”; then follow “Read the press release”) [hereinafter Sugary
Drinks Press Release].
213
See, e.g., Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 6, at 720 (“Should governments
intervene in a matter that is basically about choice? . . . Given the health crisis that the
world is facing, legislation and programs at all levels should be allowed and
encouraged.”); see also Scott Hensley, New York City Wants to Ban Food Stamps for
Sodas, NPR HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/10/07/
130399285/new-york-city-wants-to-ban-food-stamps-for-sodas; see also New York Passes
Trans Fat Ban, MSNBC.COM (DEC. 5, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16051436/
ns/health-diet_and_nutrition.
214
See Cummings, supra note 6, at 287 (“Taxpayers already bear a significant
portion of the U.S. healthcare costs associated with obesity.”).
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healthcare system, with costs around $73.4 billion in just
2009.215 Moreover, even fifteen years ago, medical costs related
to obesity, which were partially funded by Medicaid and
Medicare, were around $78.5 billion per year.216 In fact, it has
been estimated that by 2018, “the annual medical burden of
obesity across all private and public payors [will] be as high as
$344 billion per year.”217 This increase in the cost of healthcare
is directly related to the increasing rates of obesity in our
country.218 Although the idea of billions of dollars is not as
shocking today as it once was,219 these startling statistics
perhaps may be the basis for an argument in the near future
claiming that the federal government should pass further
regulations like the NYC schemes discussed below.220 Although
many support such efforts, this kind of legislation damages the
foundation that makes our country America the free and
should not be considered by Congress.221
B.

NYC’s Uninspiring & Misguided Pursuits

Many have questioned whether NYC should enact such
paternalistic laws.222 Convincing arguments have been made on
both sides of the debate.223 On the one hand, as noted above, the
obesity crisis in America is out of control, costing citizens
billions of dollars as well as their lives. On the other hand, we
215

See A Population-Based Policy and Systems Change Approach to Prevent and
Control Hypertension, Institute of Medicine Consensus Report, INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS. (Feb.
22, 2010), http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2010/A-Population-Based-Policy-and-Systems-ChangeApproach-to-Prevent-and-Control-Hypertension.aspx.
216
Specifically, these federal health-insurance programs paid for about half of
these medical costs. See Castles, supra note 179 (citation omitted).
217
Id. (citation omitted). “Within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, the
Office of the Actuary provides annuals [sic] projections of health care spending for
categories within the National Health Expenditure Accounts. The National Health
Expenditure Accounts track health spending by source of funds . . . and by type of service
or service providers.” Id. at 1 n.4.
218
See id. at 1.
219
See id.
220
“[I]f Americans [do] not slim down as a result of menu labeling, the
government might require restaurants to take further action . . . and they’ll push for
more . . . . I don’t think this is taking us down a very appetizing course.” Rosenbloom,
supra note 158; see also Esther Choi, Trans Fat Regulation: A Legislative Remedy for
America’s Heartache, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 507, 538 (2008).
221
“Derogative generalities such as the ‘nanny state,’ ‘big brother,’ and ‘food
police’ are some of the characterizations used by citizens who oppose government
regulation . . . .” Cummings, supra note 6, at 290-91.
222
See, e.g., Spivey, supra note 197, at 306 (“Does [New York City] have the
power to enact this ban? . . . Should New York City enact this ban?”).
223
See generally id.
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live in a country that is founded on few, but vital and
fundamental, principles stemming from our federal
Constitution. In the advent of the passage of the PPACA, and
realistic threat of more paternalistic legislation passing in the
future, this note sides with the latter in the debate.
1. The Paternalistic Schemes
This section offers a brief description of the three abovementioned NYC schemes and explains why they are inherently
unconstitutional. The justification provided by NYC for each of
these initiatives is that it would directly and effectively combat
the startling and increasing rates of obesity, diabetes, and
hypertension amongst its citizens.224
a. Trans-Fat Ban
In one of the most intrusive forms of government
involvement to date, on December 5, 2006, NYC passed a
regulation225 that restricts all restaurants that hold a permit by
the NYC Health Department226 from including more than 0.5
grams of artificial trans fats per serving227 in both food
preparation and food served.228 However, the ban does not
regulate natural trans fats, like those in dairy products or red
meats.229 This amendment to the Health Code became effective
on July 1, 2007, and allowed for a phase-in period of several
months—between six and eighteen—depending on the use of
trans fat in the establishment and the type of food it served.230

224

See Sugary Drinks Press Release, supra note 212; see also Cutting Salt,
supra note 210; The Regulation to Phase Out Artificial Trans Fat in New York City
Food Service Establishments, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/
cardio/cardio-transfat-bro.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Trans Fat Ban].
225
N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b) (2008).
226
Trans Fat Ban, supra note 224.
227
This note does not discuss trans fats and the associated health risks in any
detail; to learn more about this, see id.; see also The Campaign to Ban Partially
Hydrogenated Oils, BAN TRANS FATS, http://www.bantransfats.com/abouttransfat.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
228
See Trans Fat Ban, supra note 224.
229
Id.
230
See, e.g., Cardiovascular Disease Prevention, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.
gov/html/doh/html/cardio/cardio-transfat-healthcode.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2011)
(“[R]estaurants had until July 1, 2007, to make sure that all oils, shortening and
margarine containing artificial trans fat used for frying or for spreads have less than
0.5 grams of trans fat per serving. Oils and shortening used to deep fry yeast dough
and cake batter were not included in the first deadline. The second deadline was July
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NYC, again, was the first city in the country to enact such a
ban,231 because, “[b]ased on the most conservative estimates,
artificial trans fat kills at least 500 New Yorkers each
year . . . .”232
b. Sodium-Reduction Initiative
On January 11, 2010, the Board of Health released the
“National Salt Reduction Initiative,” which targets restaurants
and FSEs and asks them to voluntarily reduce the salt levels in
fare offered.233 NYC has appointed itself leader of this
movement, seeking to reduce salt levels in both packaged and
restaurant foods over the next five years by twenty-five
percent.234 This initiative, if successful, could cut our national
sodium intake by twenty percent.235 Unlike the mandatory trans
fat ban, this scheme is currently voluntary.236 On the one hand,
it is difficult to determine when this campaign will transform
into a regulation, as many believe that it will not have a
serious impact on national health because it does not seek to
decrease sodium content enough.237 On the other hand, this
campaign looks a lot like NYC’s original movement to cut trans
fat from restaurant fare, which only became enforced after it
did not work as a voluntary scheme.238 Accordingly, this note
predicts that the sodium-reduction scheme will be compulsory
in the very near future.

1, 2008. By that date, all foods containing artificial trans fat must have less than 0.5
grams of trans fat per serving.”).
231
New York Passes Trans Fat Ban, MSNBC.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/16051436/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
232
See Cardiovascular Disease Prevention, supra note 230.
233
Tyler Anderson, Hold the Salt: The Gathering Push for Sodium Reduction in
Food Products, FOOD LIABILITY L. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.foodliabilitylaw.com/
2010/01/articles/legislation-2/hold-the-salt-the-gathering-push-for-sodium-reduction-in-foodproducts.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Cutting Salt, supra note 210; see also William Neuman, Citing Hazard, New
York Says Hold the Salt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/
business/11salt.html?_r=1.
237
See, e.g., Tom Randall & Shannon Pettypiece, New York Pushes for 25%
Salt Reduction in U.S. Foods, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aMAGgUeMSmr4.
238
Neuman, supra note 236.
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c. Food Stamp Restriction
On October 10, 2010, NYC embarked on its most recent
“public health push” when it asked the federal government to
allow it to pass legislation that would ban citizens from using
their food stamps to purchase sugary drinks that contain
greater than ten calories per cup.239 But the law would not
regulate beverages that do not contain added sugar, like juice
or milk.240 Presently, the food stamp system, which has been in
place for over fifty years, “does not . . . restrict any other foods
based on nutrition.”241 The only limitations on food stamps are
that they may not be used to purchase “alcohol, cigarettes or
items such as pet food, vitamins or household goods.”242 The
intention of the food stamp program is to aid those who need
assistance, and not to dictate what they should or should not
eat.243 Today, 1.7 million NYC residents receive food stamps and
spend about $135 million a year on sugary drinks.244
2. Due Process Concerns
Many NYC restaurant owners and patrons have
opposed these campaigns and expressed their discontent with
the government dictating what they can serve or eat.245 What
these dissatisfied citizens likely do not realize, however, is that
they are victims of more than just frustration, because with
each enactment of these paternalistic schemes, they have also
had one of their most fundamental rights violated. At the core
of the problem is that American citizens have a right to
privacy,246 and within that right, the privilege to determine
what enters their bodies—or, in other words, to decide what
239

See Sugary Drinks Press Release, supra note 212; see also Hensley, supra

note 213.
240

Hensley, supra note 213.
NY Seeks to Ban Sugary Drinks from Food Stamp Buys, AETNA INTELIHEALTH,
http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/EMI/333/8015/1377711.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
242
Id.
243
See, e.g., Keep the Fizz in Foodstamps, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2010, 2:00 AM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/10/19/747915/keep-the-fizz-in-food-stamps.html.
244
Terry J. Allen, Should Food Stamps Be Used for Soda?, ALTERNET (Dec. 7,
2010), http://www.alternet.org/vision/149116/should_food_stamps_be_used_for_soda.
245
Arun Kristian Das, Chefs Call Proposed New York Salt Ban ‘Absurd,’ MYFOXNY
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.myfoxny.com/dpp/news/local_news/new_york_state/chefs-call-prop
osed-new-york-salt-ban-absurd-20100310-akd (“[C]hefs and restaurant owners . . . are tired of
politicians dictating what they can serve and what people can eat. They have opposed the city’s
anti-sodium and anti-trans fat campaigns.”).
246
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
241
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they will or will not consume. Although many have opined that
NYC has acted within its broad police powers to preserve
public health and therefore has not overstepped its
boundaries,247 these arguments fail to recognize that the abovementioned regulation and pursuits offend our federal laws and
are unconstitutional.
Although these regulations and pursuits would not
likely violate the Commerce Clause248 or the Equal Protection
Clause249 of our federal Constitution, all of these initiatives that
go beyond information disclosure violate the Due Process
clauses.250 The Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that neither the federal government nor
any state “shall . . . deprive [any person] of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”251 Similar to the First
Amendment analysis discussed in Part III of this note,252 courts
decide challenges based on substantive due process using levels
of scrutiny to determine how much protection it will afford to
the right in question.253 Not all of our privileges as citizens are
explicitly stated in the federal Constitution itself, but the Court
has commonly found that the fundamental rights recognized in
its jurisprudence are implicitly contained therein.254 The Court
247

See generally Spivey, supra note 197, at 293-94.
See id. at 294, 306. The only way, it seems, that such federal action could
be problematic is if these issues were deemed by a federal court to be strictly of state
concern, and thus the federal scheme would violate the Tenth Amendment. See
Flesichhacker & Gittelsohn, supra note 183, at 35; see also Sarah Romero, Local Bans
on Trans Fats: A New (and Legal) Way Forward, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Apr. 5, 2007),
http://hlpronline.com/2007/04/transfat. For an argument to the contrary, see Katharine
Kruk, Of Fat People and Fundamental Rights: The Constitutionality of the New York
City Trans-Fat Ban, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 864 (2010).
249
Does New York City’s Trans-Fat Ban Go Too Far?, supra note 207; see also Is
the New York City Board of Health’s Ban on Trans Fats in Restaurants Constitutional?,
HELIUM: USNEWS (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.helium.com/items/1015112-is-the-new-yorkcity-board-of-healths-ban-on-trans-fats-in-restaurants (“The Equal Protection Clause
prohibits invidious discrimination, such as racial discrimination. ‘People in New York City’
or ‘people who like to eat trans fats’ are a far cry from the types of victims that the 14th
Amendment was designed to protect. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply.”).
250
This note focuses solely on the substantive due process rights of American
citizens that may be violated, and does not cover any economic due process
infringements committed against the restaurant industry. For a discussion on whether
a challenge brought against the New York City trans fat ban on economic due process
grounds would be successful, see Kruk, supra note 248, at 866-67 (“[C]ourts would
likely decline to overturn the trans-fat ban based on an alleged infringement of the
substantive, economic due process rights of New York City restaurateurs.”).
251
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
252
See supra text accompanying notes 74-100.
253
See Kruk, supra note 248, at 864.
254
See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (stating that these
rights are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).
248
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has found that substantive due-process rights are two-fold: the
right must be “deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and
tradition,”255 and it must be carefully described.256 If the Court
determines that the legal interest being challenged is a
fundamental right, the challenged restriction on the right will
be subject to the highest level of scrutiny.257
The Court has decided many cases regarding “the right
to privacy and other constitutionally-guaranteed, fundamental
rights” and it has evaluated each of these cases “under the
framework of strict scrutiny,” which, is the ultimate safeguard
of due process rights.258 Most notably, the Court has applied
strict scrutiny to a woman’s right to an abortion,259 which could
be indicative of a fundamental right of Americans to control
what does or does not enter their bodies.260 Each of the three
recent NYC initiatives restrains the ability of residents to
make their own consumption decisions; that is, to decide what
ingredients or food products may or may not enter their bodies.
If Congress responds to the recent critiques of section 4205 of
the PPACA261 by emulating these NYC laws, it is likely that it
would be challenged as infringing on the guarantees of the due
process clause.262 This note predicts that the Court would strike
down any such additions or amendments as unconstitutional.
It is likely that the Court would analyze the addition of
any paternalistic restriction under strict scrutiny because these
255

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion);
see also Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
256
See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
257
See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
258
Kruk, supra note 248, at 864 & n.57 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-48 (1992) for the idea that the Constitution guarantees “a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter”).
259
See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 845-48; see also City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973).
260
See generally Control Over One’s Body Not Just Right of Pregnant Women,
STATE NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.statenews.com/index.php/article/2008/10/
control_over_ones_body_not_just_right_of_pregnant_women (“[A]n adult has the basic
right of controlling his or her own body. . . . [T]his also must include controlling all of
one’s own body, not just abortion.”); see also Kruk, supra note 248, at 865 (“Healthrelated rights are generally considered to be part of the bundle of privacy rights that
are given strict scrutiny in the Due Process Clause context . . . protecting the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ever-evolving realm of personal liberty.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
261
Many articles have critiqued the federal government for not going far
enough with the law. See, e.g., Schulman, supra note 6.
262
As the federal equivalent of these laws is unconstitutional, for the same
reasons this note contends that the law passed by NYC is equally unconstitutional.
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NYC initiatives infringe a fundamental right. Assuming that
the Court would find that the “right to make dietary
decisions”263 or the right to determine what enters your body is
a fundamental right,264 to survive strict scrutiny analysis the
government would have to set forth a compelling justification
for its law, showing the gravity of its interest in passing the
law and that the regulation has been as narrowly-tailored as
possible.265 To be narrowly tailored, the challenged legislation
cannot be either overinclusive or underinclusive in its scope.266
The government’s proposed rationale would be the same
as the rationale for its menu calorie-disclosure provision: to
improve the health of citizens by decreasing rising national
epidemics.267 Although this goal of reducing the prevalence of
serious national epidemics would most likely be found to be
compelling,268 the government’s position would certainly fail on
the narrow-tailoring prong of the analysis, as each of these
measures are underinclusive.269

263

Kruk, supra note 248, at 871.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (discussing the
importance of fundamental rights in the realm of personal-health choices).
265
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Our opinions applying the doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold that the
Due Process Clause prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).
266
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New
Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 478 (1989) (“Under strict scrutiny, apparently any
overinclusion or underinclusion is too much.” (citing Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969))).
267
See generally Press Release, FDA, FDA Releases Guidance on Federal Menu
Labeling Requirements (Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm223880.htm. The rationale underlying the New
York City trans fat law sheds some guidance on what the purported federal justification
would be. The Board of Health stated that
264

[t]his amendment to the Health Code is promulgated pursuant to §§ 558 and
1043 of the Charter. Section 558(b) and (c) of the Charter empowers the
Board of Health to amend the Health Code and to include in the Health Code
all matters to which the Department’s authority extends. Section 1043 grants
the Department rule-making authority.
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF
AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.08) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 1 (2006)
[hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION 3].
268
The Court has previously held that safeguarding the public health is a
compelling interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973); see also Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993) (stating, in dicta, that
protecting the public interest is a legitimate governmental interest).
269
Kruk, supra note 248, at 873 n.137 (“An underinclusive statute is one that
fails to extend to all matters that should properly be addressed by a particular
ordinance or regulation.”).
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First, the trans fat law is underinclusive as it only
regulates artificial trans fats.270 Artificial trans fats only
account for 80% of trans fats used in food preparation in
restaurants and FSEs;271 and so the ban, in its current form,
“only applies to four-fifths” of the problem.272 Clearly, the ban
could be more narrowly tailored if it applied to currently
exempt items such as natural trans fats, products sold in
grocery stores, and/or food sold in restaurants in their original
packaging.273 As these items are not included in the regulation,
it follows that only a limited and specific portion of trans fats
are being regulated, meaning that the ban is not narrowly
tailored.
Second, it has been argued that the salt-reduction
campaign does not go far enough to make any real difference as
it only bans a minimal amount of sodium in regulated
products.274 Likewise, the voluntary scheme only targets about
75 to 80 percent of the average person’s daily salt intake.275 In
addition, the sodium-reduction campaign does not target table
salt, which may still be placed on tables at these
establishments, ready for consumer overuse.276 Accordingly, this
scheme is also poorly tailored.
Finally, there is no doubt the Court would find that the
food-stamp proposal is inadequately tailored. To start, this
scheme only applies to a particular class of people, those using
food stamps, and fails to regulate all other persons who do not
use food stamps. Also, the ban would prevent the use of food
stamps to purchase soda and other sugary drinks, but still
allows for the purchase of other unhealthy and very sugary
foods.277 Thus, like the trans fat ban and sodium-reduction
270

N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b) (2008).
NOTICE OF ADOPTION 3, supra note 267, at 2.
272
Kruk, supra note 248, at 874.
273
See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b).
274
See, e.g., Randall & Pettypiece, supra note 237 (“The salt reduction won’t
have as much impact on national health as [other initiatives like the calorie law and the
trans fat law]. . . . A 50 percent reduction would be more appropriately ambitious.”).
275
Chuck Bennett, Food-Nanny Mike Declares War on Salt in NYers Diets, N.Y.
POST (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/food_nanny_mike_to_ny_halt_
the_salt_XpeycWZo3bLV2ODxFkv8VM.
276
Id.
277
See Sherry F. Colb, No Buying Soda with Food Stamps? Considering Mayor
Bloomberg’s New Health Initiative, FINDLAW (Oct. 27, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/colb/20101027.html (stating that there are “two under-inclusiveness problems
involved in cutting sodas out of Food Stamp eligibility—as to the targeted population
(only people receiving food stamps, rather than everyone in [NYC]) and as to the targeted
products (sugary sodas, instead of all unhealthy foods)”).
271
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pursuit, this measure would likely be struck down as
unconstitutional.
C.

The Better Solution: Mandate More Educational
Programs

The federal menu calorie-disclosure law is a great start,
but, as discussed above, Congress should avoid copying all of
the NYC food-based health initiatives. Instead, our federal
government should continue to explore other edifying,
information-disclosure methods for regulation, as these
methods do not compromise any fundamental rights
guaranteed in our federal Constitution.278 This section discusses
how the federal government has already implemented and
should continue to adopt educational methods to combat our
national epidemics.
In a 2003 speech, a former United States Surgeon
General coined the phrase “health literacy,” which is “the
ability of an individual to understand, access, and use healthrelated information and services.”279 Even before its new menu
calorie-disclosure law, our federal government has taken this
health-literate approach towards educating the public about
their food choices. For example, the FDA enacted a rule in
2006, which requires all manufacturers of food products to
state on the product’s Nutrition Facts label, in a separate line
immediately under the statement of the product’s saturated
fats, the amount of trans-fatty acids it contains.280 This
legislation, functionally speaking, does not “ban nor reduce the
amount of trans-fats present in grocery store food. . . . [but
rather] simply serve[s] to make consumers aware of what they
are eating.”281 Thus, this recent regulation recognizes that
American citizens should be informed about how much trans
fat is contained within the food they purchase and does not
create the same legal predicament as the NYC trans fat ban.
The principle is simple: instead of telling the public
what to consume, teach them about what they are consuming
so that they can make informed choices. This note urges
278

For a fantastic discussion of the appeal of information disclosure laws and
their effects, see Winkles, supra note 133, at 557-72.
279
Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, U.S. Surgeon Gen., Remarks at the Am.
Enter. Inst. Obesity Conference (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
news/speeches/obesity061003.htm; see also Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 6, at 725.
280
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-.106 (2006).
281
Kruk, supra note 248, at 862.
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Congress to continue to enact mandates similar to the FDA’s
trans-fat-disclosure law and the PPACA’s menu caloriedisclosure provision, as they will educate our nation without
infringing on fundamental rights. Most importantly, by
increasing society’s knowledge through these measures, the
federal government could potentially influence patrons to
demand healthier options from regulated establishments,
which would slowly eradicate our frightening national
epidemics, without sacrificing America the free.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The legal and social successes of Regulation 81.50
served as important inspiration for our federal government. As
obesity and diabetes have become national health concerns,
NYC pioneered a crucial step towards a healthier America.
With simple calorie disclosure, consumers are educated about
their food choices but still maintain the option of ignoring this
nutritional information. Thus, although their enjoyment of
their fare may be compromised, they still get to decide what
they consume. Unfortunately, NYC’s other recent food-based
health initiatives have headed down a dangerous and
unconstitutional path. NYC’s recent schemes undermine the
very foundation of one of the most important rights granted to
all citizens by our federal Constitution. For that reason,
Congress should not attempt to emulate these initiatives, but
should instead focus its attention on creating more educational,
information-disclosure regulations. It is these instructive
mandates that will benefit our nation most of all.
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